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The timing of openness in a radical innovation project, a temporal and loose 
coupling perspective 
1. Introduction 
 While firms are prone to opening their innovation models in order to acquire resources 
and complementary assets, particularly when they operate in highly turbulent and 
technologically intensive environments (Katila and Mang, 2003; Gassmann and Enkel, 2004; 
Schweitzer et al, 2011), there are also several risks such as misappropriation of their 
knowledge resources by external partners (Alexy, Criscuolo and Salter, 2009), loss of control 
over the technological trajectory (Almirall and Casadesus-Masanell, 2010)  and erosion of the 
uniqueness of internal competences (Ciravegna and Maielli, 2011; Manzini, Lazzarotti and 
Pellegrini, 2016). All of these risks constrain openness and are likely to dampen the ability of 
firms to profit from their innovations, and consequently may lead to a reversion to a closed 
model (Appleyard and Chesbrough, 2017). Building on the Profit from Innovation 
(henceforth, PFI) framework of Teece (1986), the purpose of this paper is to address the 
tension between openness/closedness at the project level by exploring project-level processes 
that determine the ability of an innovating firm to maximize profits and reduce the risks of 
misappropriation.  
Previous studies have shown that a firm’s openness choices go hand in hand with their 
appropriability strategies in order to maximize the returns from their innovation (Laursen and 
Salter, 2014; Teece, 1986; Zobel, Balsmeier and Chesbrough, 2016). The large majority of 
studies on open innovation and appropriability are at the firm level, yet firms organize 
innovation activities in R&D projects. There are conceptual tensions between open innovation 
at the firm and project levels, as the dynamics of open innovation at the project level are 
different from firm level dynamics due to the presence of project contextual factors 
(Vanhaverbeke; Chesbrough and West, 2014).  R&D projects develop over time and therefore 
the project level of analysis rather than the firm level is most directly subject to time-
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dependent variables, such as innovation speed (Kessler and Chakrabarti, 1996), speed of 
reaching the market, or the timing of partnerships in R&D projects (Milison and Wilemon, 
1992; Handfield, Ragatz, Petersen, and Monczka, 1999; Swink, Talluri and Pandejpong, 
2006). There are many alternative models of openness and closedness, and a company can 
rely on innovation partners during one or more stages but not necessarily from the start to the 
end. There may be very good reasons for keeping an NPD project closed during specific 
stages of the project, and the timing of the shift between closed and open innovation during 
the project may be crucial to its success. The timing of openness to external partners is a 
central characteristic of NPD projects, but when, and how a project team manages the shift 
from a low degree of openness to a higher degree of openness are under-researched questions 
in the innovation management literature. 
Given the limited theory and empirical evidence on how the timing of openness is 
managed at the project level, we have conducted an in-depth case study at Jaguar Land Rover 
(UK) which captures the full lifecycle of a radical NPD project. By incorporating the element 
of time in the theory-building process, we contribute to a process and temporal perspective of 
open innovation by identifying two core project processes which influenced the ability of 
Jaguar to maximize profits from the innovation: a) the timing of openness to external partners, 
and b) an external loose coupling project strategy.  On the one hand, the timing of shifting 
from a closed to an open model of innovation was enabled by a pro-active change in the 
formal defense strategy (i.e. submission of a patent), and an internal loose coupling project 
strategy that involved autonomy of the project champion and internal engineers’ weak 
membership of internal engineers in the project (Weick, 1976). On the other, an external loose 
coupling project strategy was enabled by the deployment of two informal appropriation 
mechanisms namely, the reduction of project scope to external partners and the development 
of guarded relationships with them.  
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Section Two, we review the open innovation and 
appropriability literature at both the firm and project levels, and we introduce our main research 
question. Next, in Section Three, we present the setting of the case study and the method, 
including data collection and analysis. In Section Four, we provide the results of the case study. 
Finally, in Section Five, we discuss the results and outline the limitations of the study, and also 
provide several directions for future research. 
2. Theoretical approach to open innovation and appropriability       
2.1 Open innovation, and appropriability at the firm level 
Open innovation entails challenges in relation to the appropriation of the outcomes 
derived from inter-firm collaborative efforts (Belderbos et al., 2014; Di Minin and Faems, 
2013). At the firm level, the drivers to open to external partners in the innovation process are 
related to managerial attitudes towards its appropriability strategy (Laursen and Salter, 2014).  
The deployment of formal (i.e. patents, registration of design patterns and copyrights) and 
informal defense mechanisms (i.e. secrecy, lead time, sales and service effort) can partly 
mitigate the risks of misappropriation by external partners, thus enabling the innovating firm 
to open to external partners while profiting from its innovation (Amara, Landry and Traor, 
2008; Das, 2005; Katila and Mang, 2008; Hurmelinna-Laukkane, 2009; Levin et al., 1987; 
Teece, 1986). There is an ambiguous relationship between appropriation mechanisms and 
open innovation; some studies suggest that IP enables open innovation as it is a safeguard for 
knowledge protection and a signaling mechanism for displaying innovative capabilities to 
attract new collaborators (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013; Laursen and Salter, 2014; Teece, 1988; 
Reitzig, 2004; Rivette and Kline, 1999, 2000; Zobel et al., 2016); others claim that formal 
mechanisms, specifically patents, may hinder open innovation relationships at the firm level 
(Katila and Mang, 2003; Katila, Rosenberger and Eisenhardt, 2008; West and Gallagher, 
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2006). In addition, informal appropriation mechanisms such as complexity, secrecy and lead 
time have a stronger link with search openness than formal appropriation mechanisms such as 
patents, trademarks, copyrights and design rights (Zobel, Loshina and Hagerdoon, 2017).  
Prior studies examining the role of appropriation mechanisms have mainly been conducted at 
the firm level and there is limited understanding when and how managers deploy different 
types of defense mechanisms, both formal and informal ones, at different stages of NPD 
projects to reduce the risks of misappropriation. 
2.2 Open innovation, appropriability, and project strategies at the NPD project level 
The aforementioned studies that have explored the drivers for open innovation have 
largely focused on the firm level rather than the individual NPD project level, despite the fact 
that NPD projects are likely to vary in their payoff from open innovation within the same firm 
(Salge et al., 2013; Vanhaverbeke, Du, Leten and Aalders, 2014). Recently, scholars have 
started to address the lack of understanding of open innovation at the project level (Bahemia 
and Squire, 2010; Bahemia, Squire and Cousins, 2017; Du et al., 2014; Salge et al., 2013). By 
moving the angle of analysis from the firm to the project level, these studies have found that 
the contingencies influencing the financial performance of open innovation at the project level 
are related to the type of innovation (incremental versus radical), the strength of formal 
appropriation mechanism (Bahemia and Squire, 2010; Bahemia, Squire and Cousins, 2017), 
the degree and nature of the formalization of the collaboration, the type of external partner 
(science-based versus market-based partners), and the type of governance mechanism (rigid 
versus flexible contract application) (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010; Du et al., 2014; Salge et 
al., 2013). Although these studies have contributed to a better theoretical and empirical 
understanding of specific project factors and strategies that influence the financial returns 
from the innovation when firms adopt an open innovation strategy at the project level, there 
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remains a lack of understanding about the relationship between the timing of open innovation 
in R&D projects, as for example, the timing of when innovating firms choose to rely on open 
or closed innovation during different stages of NPD projects, and the link between this timing 
decision and their ability to appropriate profits. The question related to the factors that 
determine the ability of firms to profit from their innovation is central to the seminal PFI 
model (Teece, 1986). 
2.3 Extending the Profiting from Innovation (PFI) model in the context of open innovation 
The PFI model predicts that the strength of appropriability regime, ownership of 
complementary assets, and emergence of dominant design determine whether the innovator or 
imitator will get the lion’s share of the rents of the innovation (Teece, 1986). In the original 
PFI framework, appropriability regimes are taken as a given, implying implicitly a fixed 
conceptualization of time. However, appropriability regimes are endogenously shaped by the 
behaviors and strategies of firms (Pisano, 2006). Typically, within a NPD project, technology 
protection will evolve from weak to strong as IP will be written, submitted, filed and granted 
as the project proceeds. Looking at the creation of IP as a process that develops over time 
helps us understand when an innovating company can decide to open up to partners. Another 
factor is the distribution of the complementary assets (Teece, 1986, 2006) between the 
innovating company and the potential innovation partners; the need for different 
complementary assets evolves as an NPD project progresses. Due to the inherent uncertainty 
of the NPD process, the demand for resources becomes more specific only as the project 
evolves through the different stages, and an innovating company may have to shift from 
closed to open innovation if the required capabilities are absent in the company.  
Extending the PFI model, we focus on the project level and relax the assumption that 
the appropriability regime is fixed over time for the reasons mentioned above. In the case 
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study, we combine process theory (Langley et al., 2013; Pentland, 1999) with a temporal 
lens (Ancona and Caldwell, 2001; Langley, 1999) to explore how events and appropriation 
mechanism (formal and informal) evolve during the project as processes, and hence 
consider how managers adjust their innovation (closed and open innovation model), 
appropriability, and project strategies to profit from the innovation and to minimize the risks 
of misappropriation. Process research is concerned with how and why things evolve over 
time (Van de Ven and Huber, 1990; Ancona et al. 2001), while process time is 
conceptualized as being dependent on events (Morgeson, Mitchell and Liu, 2015). Using 
this line of approach, we address the following research question: when and how do 
managers make a transition between closed and open innovation1, and adjust appropriability 
and project strategies during the lifecycle of a New Product Development project to 
maximize profits from the innovation?  
Setting of the Case Study and Method  
3.1 The context 
Jaguar is a luxury car manufacturer forming part of the Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) group, 
whose main operations are based in the UK. The project for the Jaguar XF started in 2001 and 
launched onto the market in 2006. The unit of analysis of the case study is at the project level. 
Our case study focused on the development of the main radical technological innovation of 
the Jaguar XF: the electronic rotary gear selector actuated by a multi-stable shift-by-wire 
system that replaces the traditional gear stick. Instead of a traditional gear stick, there is only a 
circular knob that the driver has to turn to select the driving mode, which is enabled by an 
                                                          
1 By a closed model of innovation, we imply that there is reliance on internal R&D rather than on collaboration 
with external partners during the NPD project. As for the open model of innovation, we capture the degree of 
openness, in terms of collaboration with different types of external partner, such as suppliers, customers, 
universities, consultants, and open innovation intermediaries, during the project (Bahemia et al., 2017; Leiponen, 
2012). 
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electronic multi-stable ‘shift-by-wire’ system. When the start button is pressed, the gear 
selector rises and comes into the palm of the driver’s hand; this motion is described by the 
design manager as:  
 “The Jaguar handshake, this human machine interface technology creates genuine 
package benefits, it was seen by the public as being first to market … it was something that no 
one else had done before and we created a massive selling point for the car… and it was the 
wow factor of the XF and has increased its emotional appeal.” 
In the automotive industry, although other car manufacturers have been experimenting 
with new designs for shifters to replace traditional gears, the drive mode of these shifters is 
based on a mono-stable system, implying that it always returns to a central position not 
indicative of a selected drive mode. A mono-stable system was a major innovation challenge 
for the automotive industry as “legislation in the UK prohibits the use of a gear selector that 
can be placed in a position that does not reflect the actually selected gear, as was the case 
with a mono-stable system” (Director of Patent, Jaguar), and therefore the concept could not 
be brought to market. The inventiveness brought by Jaguar was the development of a rotary 
shifter based on a multi-stable system, i.e. it remains in a set position until moved. Until this 
development, the previous mono-stable system was constrained as the gear selector could be 
changed into a position that did not correspond to the actually selected gear, representing a 
safety risk for drivers. On these grounds, Jaguar has successfully been granted four patents for 
a multi-stable system for the rotary shifter, and there are additional ongoing patents which 
have been filed as a reaction to the responses of competitors. In the round of interviews that 
the authors conducted in 2015, the Advanced Technology Specialist at Jaguar highlighted the 
extent to which the rotary gear selector using a multi-stable shift-by-wire system was new to 
the automotive industry, and to the market, when it was launched:  
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“Everybody else has the concept for a mono-stable, in other words the gear selector 
always returns to the same position. Ours doesn’t do that, it stays in the position that you 
started. That’s what hasn’t been done before and still hasn’t.” 
We classify the development of the electronic rotary gear selector actuated by a multi-
stable shift-by-wire system by Jaguar as a radical innovation project as it was new to the 
automotive industry and departed from previous designs (i.e. the mono-stable system), as well 
as being first to market when launched. Radical innovations are perceived to be new to the 
industry and are characterized by a discontinuity in relation to existing technology (Garcia 
and Calantone 2002; Johannessen, Olsen, and Lumpkin, 2001). In terms of the sampling 
strategy, the rotary shifter project was an ideal candidate for the case study as it is a typical 
case of a radical innovation, for which a series of patents was successfully filed by Jaguar. 
Both a closed and open innovation strategy was implemented during different stages of the 
lifecycle of the project. Thus, it was a good case to explore in-depth and explain our focal 
concept concerning the issue of timing of openness to external partners (Corbin and Strauss, 
2015). 
3.2 Data collection 
The data collection process spreads over twenty-six months starting in 2009, with 
additional interviews conducted in 2015 and 2017. There were three stages in the data 
collection. A total of forty-four interviews were conducted from the definition to the 
exploration of the problem. During the first stage of defining the problem, Jaguar’s product 
portfolio was studied via secondary data (brochures, car magazines, press reports, web site 
information, and the patent documents for the electronic gear selector). Three interviews were 
conducted with the Head of Research and engineers involved in open innovation at Jaguar. In 
parallel, a preliminary pilot-study was conducted with sixteen New Product Development 
managers from different industries such as scientific equipment, medical equipment, aircraft 
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seats and telecommunication equipment in the high value manufacturing sector in the UK. 
The aims of the preliminary interviews were to understand the key factors that managers take 
into consideration when implementing an open innovation, and to formulate the research 
problem from both a theoretical and practitioner’s perspective.  
In the second stage of data collection, we carried out twenty semi-structured interviews 
composed of fifteen interviews with the Jaguar internal development team and five interviews 
with key external partners involved in the project. Although we acknowledge the partial risk 
of retrospective sense-making as the interviewees  at Jaguar could rationalize the individual 
NPD phases by taking into account the successful outcome of the project, we have been 
careful to counter-balance this risk by incorporating the perspective of several external 
partners that have contributed to the development of the innovation.  A snowball method was 
used to develop additional contacts with internal engineers and external partners engaged in 
the project. Data were collected from the internal NPD team (head of research, project 
champion, advanced design manager and leading engineers) and from external partners 
involved. As for the procedures of the interview protocols, following each round of interviews 
with the internal NPD team, the interview guide was continuously being improved and those 
new concepts that emerged were added to the subsequent interviews. For instance, a visual 
presentation of a time-line display of the different stages of the NPD process (Figure 2, Stages 
1-5), similar to the NPD model (Handfield, Ragatz, Petersen, and Monczka, 1999), was added 
to the interview guide and respondents were asked to indicate the specific stages of the NPD 
process where external partners were involved and their level of interaction at each of these 
stages.   
Although our 2009 data were not collected when the shift occurred, we told our 
informants we were interested in the timing of the shift from closed to open, and we returned 
several times to ask further questions about what happened and in what order and when. It 
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was only when we had understood the process that we noticed its shift from tight to loose 
coupling, and the role of loose coupling in facilitating the shift to open innovation. Data 
related to the drivers and enablers of closed and open model of innovation were searched at 
each of the stages of the NPD process. The inclusion of a time-line of the NPD project to the 
interview guide allowed us to clearly detect variation in the degree of openness to external 
partners at different stages of the NPD project. By adding a visual presentation of the NPD 
project to the interview guide, each stage of the project was clearly defined and respondents 
were asked to identify the stages where external partners and the Jaguar NPD team were 
involved, thus ensuring a common understanding of the stages of the project among all 
respondents. In this way the consistency of the data collected at each stage of the NPD project 
was controlled. In the third stage of our data collection, we conducted three additional 
interviews with the Patent Director of Jaguar in 2015 on the effectiveness of the patents, and 
two further in-depth interviews with the Research Technology Strategist and Product 
Engineer in 2017. In this paper, the names of the external companies involved in the project 
are anonymized. 
3.3 Data analysis 
As the purpose of the case study was to trace and explain the processual unfolding of 
closed and open models of innovation during the same project, we adopted a process 
perspective for the data analysis for both the surface and underlying events that explain the 
temporal choices between a closed and open model of innovation. Process theorization goes 
beyond surface description to penetrate the logic behind observed temporal progressions, 
whether simple or complex, so as to capture the explanatory mechanisms that underlie the 
surface events, project processes and their enabling mechanism that change during the 
lifecycle of the project (Ancona, et al. 2001; Langley et al., 2013; Morgeson, Mitchell and 
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Liu, 2015; Pentland, 1999; Van de Ven and Huber, 1990). In line with the principle of 
inductive research, data collection and analysis were performed concurrently (Gioia, Corley 
and Hamilton 2012; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Figures 1A and 1B provide an overview of 
the analysis of how we dimensionalized the aggregate closed and open model of innovation 
during the project from the first order categories, and its related second order themes. In the 
second order analysis, we used axial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) to group the raw data 
derived from the first order analysis into theoretical categories, and the second order themes 
were then assembled as illustrated in Figures 1A and 1B to form the aggregate dimension of 
closed and open model of innovation (Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton, 2012).  
The quality of the data was ensured in several ways. First, the internal validity of the data 
was continuously checked (Yin, 2014). After data collection and analysis, the time line-display 
(Figure 2) was sent to the Project Manager, two internal engineers, and the external partners. 
Respondents were asked to confirm whether the stages when external partners were integrated 
in the NPD process were accurate. The aim of this validation process was to increase the 
reliability of the data collected. When the data collection and analysis neared its conclusion, an 
open interview was conducted with the Head of Research to validate the explanatory model, 
which illustrated the relationships between the key categories; we also sought feedback from 
the project champion on the last explanatory model. Second, construct validity was tested by 
triangulating data across different sources (Yin, 2014). A chain of evidence was used to develop 
the emerging constructs from multiple perspectives and to check that the lines of inquiry were 
converging. For example, similar semi-structured questions were addressed to internal 
members of the project, as well as to key external project partners, with the aim of 
understanding the timing of shifting from closed to open innovation from both an internal and 
external perspective.  
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4.0 Results 
Based on the five different stages of the NPD model (Handfield, Ragatz, Petersen, and 
Monczka, 1999), we examined when and how the project champion made the transition 
between closed and open innovation, and adjusted appropriability and project strategies in 
response to events that occurred during the lifecycle of the project. Figure 2 illustrates a 
dynamic representation from a closed to an open model of innovation. All the factors that 
determine the ability of Jaguar to profit from the innovation, as predicted by Teece (1986), are 
identified in Figure 2 to distinguish them from those which emerged from our case study. 
 
Figure 2. From top to bottom: The project has 5 phases from idea generation to Ramp up for 
production. Jaguar kept the project closed in phases 1 and 2 and opened it  in the three other ones. IPR 
regime goes from weak (A1) to strong as Jaguar submitted a patent (A2) and later filed it (B). E1 
indicates the start of the internal crisis and E2 indicates the end of the internal crisis . Drivers for 
closed innovation and for shifting from closed to open innovation are represented in the bottom grey 
boxes on left hand side. The closed model innovation was enabled by Jaguar world class R&D 
capabilities as shown in the bottom grey box on the left hand side. For readying the shift and 
implementation from closed to open innovation in the middle stage of the project, two core project 
processes were deployed: the timing of openness and the implementation of an external loose coupling 
project strategy(dotted black boxes). These two core project processes combined with their respective 
enablers (bottom grey boxes, right hand side) drove the success of profiting from the the innovation 
(black box, far right hand side). The supplier, Crios also filed a patent during the project. 
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4.1 A closed model of innovation in the early stages of the project 
The idea of the rotary shifter was generated and initiated by the Research Technology 
Strategist and Product Engineer, who was the project champion.  In the upstream stages of the 
project, research and development was done in-house to develop the concept of the rotary 
shifter and the enabling concept of shift-by-wire. The project champion, designers and 
engineers were secretive and preferred not to form collaborative relationships with any 
external partners, as the concept of a multi-stable shift-by-wire rotary gear selector was too 
fuzzy and unprotected by any patents. As the design manager pointed out:  
 “The rotary shifter enabled by the multi-stable shift-by-wire was a pure Jaguar 
innovation …. We find a problem, work it through and solve it… the rotary shifter came 
from the research department very early on during the project… we did it on our own 
and then we worked very closely with suppliers to get what we wanted in the later 
stages of the project.”  
The duration of the closed model of innovation during the early stages of the project was 
about one year and this period was important for internally building and developing the 
maturity of the concept prior to the filing of a patent: 
“I didn’t want to open it earlier because we hadn’t got adequate protection for the idea, 
nor had I got adequate maturity in the concept. So, going earlier I would have had an 
immature concept and the risk of losing the intellectual property would have been 
higher” (Project Champion, Research Technology Strategist and Product Engineer) 
Several key drivers influenced Jaguar’s decision not to open up the first two stages of the 
project to any external partners. They include a weak patent position, high risk of knowledge 
misappropriation, and the time required to increase the technological maturity of the rotary 
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shifter prior to the application of a patent. A closed model of innovation was enabled by 
Jaguar’s world class internal R&D capabilities. 
As the project was progressing, there was a high level of concern among the Senior 
Engineering Team about both the risk of failure and the readiness of the market to accept a 
change from the predominant stereotypical control of a stick shifter to a rotary one: 
“At this point, I knew that the business itself was very divided on the concept. There 
were some people who thought it might have been a good idea. There were an awful lot 
of concerns.” (Project Champion) 
The emergence of the Senior Engineering Team’s concerns can be interpreted as a crisis 
because an escalation of this state of tension would have led to an early termination of the 
project, thus jeopardizing the opportunity for Jaguar to profit from the opportunity of a 
potentially promising radical innovation. The emergence of this crisis (Figure 2: E1) was the 
key temporal marker at the end of stage two of the project, which triggered the need for a 
faster response time, and innovation speed so as to address these concerns swiftly and to 
restore trust in and support for the project: 
 “So, some of the concerns were ‘Customers won’t like this when they’re driving’ or 
‘Customers won’t be able to use this’ or ‘Customers might have to look down more than 
they would if it was a stick shifter and therefore look away from the road’… The best 
way to alleviate all of these concerns was to know every concern that everybody had 
and then conduct experiments to generate data that would either show that their 
concern was in fact valid or would demonstrate that their concern was not valid.’ 
(Project Champion) 
To do so, the project champion required a working prototype vehicle to conduct experiments 
to compare and contrast the manoeuvres of participants driving vehicles with a rotary shifter 
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and with a traditional stick shifter. Although there was the capability to develop the working 
prototype in-house, the project champion allocated this engineering task to Venus, an 
engineering service company, to accelerate the response time and innovation speed:  
“It would have taken me longer to get all the people in the workshops together, all the 
people that knew about shift-by-wire together, all the people in the rapid prototyping 
team to generate the prototype parts. Whereas an engineering services company has got 
everything there and I can tell them, ‘This is what I want and I want it by this time. It 
was definitely in my interest to get the concerns addressed as fast as possible.’” (Project 
Champion). 
4.2 Timing of shifting between a closed to an open model in the middle stages of the project 
The shift from a closed to an open model of innovation in stage three was marked by the 
submission of a patent for the concept of the rotary shifter on Anaqua, an invention disclosure 
submission software package (Refer to Figure 2, A2: Patent Submitted). It was the first legal 
defensive mechanism deployed against opportunistic behavior prior to opening up to any 
external partners and, at that point, the idea is legally considered as being patent pending until 
the final filing and submission of the patent (Figure 2: B Patent Filed).  In line with process 
theory (Langley et al., 2013; Pentland, 1999), we have also explored the underlying and 
generative mechanisms specific to the project structure which further facilitated the readiness 
to open to external partners , as a response to the two surface events described above 
(emergence of a crisis that led to an early submission of a patent).  
Our analysis shows that the structure of the project displays the characteristics of a 
loosely coupled system, in which elements are responsive, but retain evidence of separateness 
(Orton and Weick, 1990). The direct positive effects of a loosely coupled system are 
modularity, requisite variety, and discretion (Weick 1976). Modularity is achieved from the 
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elimination of unnecessary relationships and reduction of the number of necessary 
relationships; it is facilitated by loose couplings instead of tight couplings (Page-Jones, 1980). 
Requisite variety is observed in a loose coupling system by the extent to which its elements 
serve as a medium that can register numerous inputs with accuracy, while discretion is 
defined as the capacity for autonomous action by the agents (Orton and Weick, 1990).  
The project champion had the discretion needed to choose a faster innovation speed to 
acquire complementary resources. The decision to shift from a closed to an open model 
belonged entirely to the project champion; the high level of autonomy and discretion in the 
decision-making process enabled a smooth and swift transition from a closed to an open 
model of innovation as illustrated by the following excerpt from the interview: 
“I made the decision to go to the University of Eos and to Venus for a quotation for the 
scope of the work. Based on their quotation, I raised a purchase order. And at that 
point, that’s the only point at which I needed approval from the Head of Research.” 
(Project Champion) 
In addition, instead of having a traditional team with permanent members and strong team 
membership during the duration of the project, internal engineers and designers were brought 
in for specific project tasks in a loose way, when needed, as suggested in the evidence below.   
“It wasn’t a team. They were people that I could call upon for help for different aspects 
of the work. So, for example I had help from Design in terms of they would input what it 
would look like. So, would it be a chrome-type surface finish or would it be a leather-
type finish? So, I had input from Design. I had support from the Human Factors team, 
they helped me with the experiments.” (Project Champion) 
The weak membership of the engineers is a form of modularity as unnecessary strong 
relationships with internal engineers were avoided and it ensured a smooth integration of 
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variety (inputs from external partners) and avoidance of a defensive Not Invented Here 
syndrome (Katz and Allen, 1982). 
4.3 Benefits of shifting to an open model of innovation   
At the beginning of stage three, when the project champion shifted to an open model of 
innovation, different types of external partners such as suppliers and universities were 
allocated specific tasks related to the rotary shifter and its enabling shift-by-wire. In this way, 
the required complementary capabilities were acquired in a timely way to accelerate the NPD 
process, and to respond swiftly to the internal crisis. For example, the University of Eos 
conducted user trials and generated data about the preferences of users in terms of the optimal 
design of the rotary shifter:  
“I didn’t want to get a prototype made when at first I didn’t know if mono-stable would 
be better or multi-stable. I didn’t know what diameter to make the shift, I didn’t know 
what height to make it. So, having got that data I could then progress to a working 
prototype.” (Project Champion) 
The outcomes of the task allocated to the University of Eos were the design specifications and 
parameters for the rotary shifter in relation to its height and diameter. Based on these design 
parameters, Venus, an engineering service company, was brought into the project to build the 
prototype “because, again, it was quicker for me to do that rather than try to get a large cross 
functional team within JLR to develop the prototype in-house.”  In parallel, the project 
champion and engineers from Jaguar Land Rover were heavily involved in the project and 
were conducting internal engineering activities for the development of the concept of the 
rotary shifter.  
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From Table 1, we can also observe that the temporal map is densely populated with 
multiple activities that are fast paced, short term, and short cycle as they were compressed 
into stage three of the project, and innovation speed was gained during stage three. By 
managing a broad range of activities concurrently with both internal and external partners, the 
project champion stimulated a sense of urgency by increasing pace (Ancona et al., 2001) 
during this stage to address the concerns of internal stakeholders swiftly.  
 
Project Lifecycle Actors
Level of 
Interaction Sequence of Activities
Stage 3:Concept 
Design and Prototype
Internal: Project Champion, designors 
and engineers High
Focus on engineering work on the concept of the 
rotary shifter and shift-by-wire
External: University Of Eos Moderate
Conduct user trials to generate data and 
understanding about their preferences when using a 
rotary shifter
Moderate
Work on the best design parameters of the rotary 
shifter to fit the preferences of users
Moderate
Develop the design specifications for the rotary 
shifter (diameter and height)
External: Engineering Service Company: 
Venus High
Build prototype of the rotary shifter based on the 
above design specifications
Internal: Project Champion and different 
functions of JLR High
Use the prototype of the rotary shifter to conduct 
experiments with users to record how they 
manoeuvre the rotary shifter when driving 
Communicate the data of the internal and external 
expriments to Senior Engineering Team
External: University of Asteria Moderate
Conduct market research with customers to evaluate 
how to improve the ergonomics and ease of use of 
the rotary shifter
External: Customers Low
Conduct first clinic test with customers to collect 
feedback on the rotary shifter
Stage 4: Design and 
Engineering for 
Production Internal: Engineering Programme Team High
Decide whether to take forward the rotary shifter 
into production
High
Nominate the suppliers for the design, development 
of a production prototype
External: Engineering Service Company: 
Venus High
Support the transfer of the prototype of the rotary 
shifter to Tier 1 suppliers
High
Develop the software for the rotary shifter to be 
compatible with the overall system of the XF
High
Conduct extensive Failure Mode Effect Analysis to 
test that the rotary shifter was robust against any 
failure
Stage 5: Ramp Up to 
Production
External Strategic Suppliers: Crios and 
Jupiter High
Design and development of a fully functioning 
prototype of the electronic transmitter selector
High
Test the components for the shift-by-wire 
components
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Table 1. Low level of interaction: Customers were consulted only to provide feedback 
Moderate level of interaction: External partners were directly consulted for the development of the 
new products and to conduct trial experiments,   
High level of interaction: External partners were directly involved in the design and development of 
the innovation 
The working prototype developed by Venus was used to conduct a series of experiments with 
users to address the concerns raised by the Internal Engineering Team and to generate both 
objective and subjective data to address every point of concern raised:  
“Without data to specifically address the concerns, it’s very difficult to argue whether 
the concerns are valid or not…these concerns were very understandable and if this was 
ever going to go to production I knew that I would have to generate some data to 
address every point of concern that was raised. …..” (Project Champion) 
For example, one of the experiments was designed to collect video evidences in order to 
address the concerns of the Senior Engineering team that was related to the rotary shifter 
being potentially distracting to drivers as they would have to look down and away from the 
road more than they would with a traditional stick shift: 
 “The results of the experiment actually showed that people looked down less with the 
rotary shifter than they did with the stick shifter. So, that point was addressed very 
specifically head on that in fact the rotary shifter, in a controlled experiment, people 
looked down less.” (Engineer, Jaguar) 
After conducting a series of controlled experiments with 30 different participants, additional 
subjective data were collected and the participants were asked to report their preference 
between the stick shifter and the rotary shifter:  
“And the ultimate, the last question was, ‘If you had a choice of driving a vehicle with 
either the stick shifter or the rotary shifter which vehicle would you pick?’ and the 
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results for that were very clear. People would pick the rotary shifter vehicle.” 
(Engineer, Jaguar) 
The resulting change that occurred on the strength of the objective and subjective data and 
video-recorded evidence generated from the series of experiments was a shift from a state of 
concern (Figure 2: E1) to one of restored confidence in the potential of the rotary shifter 
(Figure 2: E2). The Senior Engineering team approved the progress of the project to the next 
stage.  By shifting to an open model of innovation to accelerate innovation speed as a means 
to respond swiftly to the crisis, the internal threat of project termination that could likely 
destroy the opportunity of future profits for Jaguar from this promising radical innovation was 
overcome. 
Following the change when the concerns were resolved, we observed further openness 
to external partners to continue improving the ergonomics of the rotary shifter before the first 
clinical test with customers. The University of Asteria conducted further market research to 
examine user acceptance in terms of the ergonomics and ease of use of the rotary shifter, and 
to improve the ergonomics of the rotary shifter. During stages four and five, there was a 
further change in the innovation model marked by a gradual progression to open the project 
further to other external partners for the design and engineering of the rotary shifter and its 
enabling shift-by-wire and to facilitate its readiness. At stage four, Design and Engineering 
for Production, as is typically the case, there was a shift in the ownership of the project from 
the project champion to the Chief Programme Engineer with a Programme Engineering Team, 
who had a budget to deliver the XF to market. As the development of the rotary shifter was 
moving towards production, the Programme Engineering Team was responsible for the 
development of a production unit of the rotary shifter and its enabling shift-by-wire that 
would be fit for mass production.  
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At that point, patents for the rotary shifter and enabling shift-by-wire had already been 
filed and the Programme Engineering Team collaborated with traditional Tier-1 suppliers for 
the detailed engineering design, development and production costs of the two items for mass 
production. Jupiter and Crios were the strategic suppliers nominated for the development of 
the shift-by-wire gearshift system. The duration of the collaboration between Crios and Jaguar 
for the rotary shifter project was two years. Table 1 shows that Crios was also integrated in 
the middle and downstream stages (4 and 5) of the project, and their role was coded as highly 
important. During the middle stages of the rotary shifter project, Crios provided a fully 
functioning prototype of the electronic transmitter selector. As a result, Crios was nominated 
as a strategic Tier-1 production supplier in stage five. Jaguar relied heavily on Crios for the 
design, development and testing of the components for the shift-by-wire system, as the 
supplier “has resources worldwide and strong capabilities from a mechanical point of view” 
(Internal Jaguar Engineer). That observation is further supported by the engineer from Crios: 
“Jaguar had the idea of what they wanted, but they relied heavily on us to turn this idea into a 
working product.” Crios evaluated the safety specifications of the rotary shifter by checking 
whether it met safety and functional considerations. In summary, the shift to an open model of 
innovation after a patent was submitted at the end of Stage Two, and the progression to 
further openness in Stage Four provided Jaguar with key benefits, such as faster response time 
to resolve the internal crisis, and access to valuable complementary capabilities from different 
types of external partners (engineering services companies, suppliers, customers and 
universities). These benefits were all critical in maximizing the ability of Jaguar to preserve 
and nurture the opportunity during its NPD process to profit from the innovation of the rotary 
shifter at a later stage. 
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4.4 The implementation of an external loose project strategy 
We can observe from Table 1 that the project champion partitioned the NPD activities 
in a modular way to the external partners. As mentioned earlier, one of the direct effects of a 
loose coupling strategy is modularity, defined as the elimination of unnecessary relationships 
(Orton and Weick, 1990: 210). Modularity can also be used to protect IP by dispersing 
information (Baldwin and Henkel, 2015), by dividing the task at hand and providing only the 
information that an agent would need to fulfill the task (Ronde, 2001). As modularity enabled 
tasks to be partitioned and worked in parallel, division of labor between firms and loose 
coupling are thus facilitated (Von Hippel, 1990, Sanchez and Mahony, 1996). In our case 
study, we observed a similar strategy where Jaguar implemented an external loose coupling 
project strategy was implemented the risk of knowledge expropriation. As illustrated in Table 
1, the scope of the development activities allocated to the external partners was reduced as 
each external partner was responsible for specific activities The reduction of the scope of 
R&D activities to external partners forms part of the deployment of an informal defense 
mechanism to minimize the risk of knowledge misappropriation, as the external parties had 
knowledge of some modules and not others.  
In addition, the project champion and engineers deployed a moderate level of secrecy 
towards the strategic external partners, as an informal relational defense mechanism against 
knowledge misappropriation. Despite the fact that Venus was heavily involved in the 
development of the multi-stable, shift-by-wire rotary gear selector, the Jaguar NPD team 
maintained a secretive, distant and circumspect approach, as one engineer at Jaguar 
commented: “Although the relationship with Venus was good, trust was not high… there is 
always an element of risk that they will seek patents too.” Jaguar only selectively disclosed 
the minimum level of information necessary for Venus to develop the prototype for the rotary 
shifter. Similar to Venus, the project champion and the engineers exercised a moderate level 
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of control and secrecy with Crios during the project by regularly requesting reports on the 
status of work in progress. The relationship was governed with contractual mechanisms such 
as non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), and fixed price contracts.  The fixed price contract was 
in fact an effective mechanism for Jaguar to keep full control over the project and in Venus’s 
view: ‘an open ended contract with a drawback budget would have been more appropriate’. 
The distance of the relationship between Jaguar and Venus is further exemplified by the fact 
that the key engineer at Venus was not yet aware that Jaguar had successfully registered a 
patent for the rotary shifter in our round of interviews in 2009. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, despite the use of an external loose coupling project strategy 
during different stages of the project, one of the external partners, Crios, independently filed 
and successfully registered a patent for a technological innovation of a component within the 
rotary shifter at stage four (design and engineering) of the project. The relationship with both 
universities was less guarded and secretive than the relationships with Venus and Crios as the 
risks of misappropriation of knowledge were lower.  For example, the collaboration with the 
University of Asteria lasted for three months and the level of cooperation was ‘constructive 
and informal’. As the task was less critical and uncertain, the Jaguar team exercised less 
pressure and control during the project as the Project Engineer at the University reported:  
‘they trusted us to do the work with minimum supervision and auditing’.  
4.5 Who profited from the innovation?  
 Jaguar largely profited from the innovation of the rotary shifter that contributed to the 
success of XF sales as “it was the most prominent technological innovation of the XF” (Head 
of Research). There are three indicators of the success of the rotary shifter. First, Jaguar was 
granted four patents for different aspects of the multi-stable shift-by-wire rotary gear selector 
in the US and a number of other jurisdictions, indicating that the multi-stable system of the 
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rotary shifter developed by Jaguar had a unique product competitive advantage, which was 
legally protected. Second, the rotary shifter was rolled out in other subsequent models of Land 
Rover and Jaguar vehicles as a result of its strong endorsement by customers. The quality of 
the shifter and the multi-stable system developed by Jaguar was good in relation to the safety 
standards of drivers; in contrast to competitors, there have been no quality issues leading to 
product recall and impairment of the ability of Jaguar to generate long term profits. Third, the 
sales performance of the XF indirectly reflects the success of the multi-stable shift-by-wire 
rotary gear selector, which was regarded as its key technological innovation. As reported by 
the Finance team of Jaguar, there was a sharp growth in sales of the XF in the UK, with an 
increase of 36% between the first half of 2008 (launch of the XF) and the first half of 2010. 
Despite the financial crisis and recession, the XF gained market share in the UK with an 
appreciation of seven per cent in the premium car market between the first half of 2008 
(12.6%) and the first half of 2010 (19.6%). However, despite the pro-active deployment of a 
range of formal and informal appropriation mechanisms combined with project strategy (i.e. 
loosely coupled project), we also observe the risk of an open innovation strategy in terms of 
inadvertent knowledge spill-over and potential threat to the profit of the innovating firm. 
Although Jaguar appropriated the lion’s share of the innovation, Crios also appropriated a 
small share by independently filing a patent. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
Our paper examines the decision NPD project managers face about whether and when 
to open their innovation projects. Previous studies that have examined the tension between 
openness and closedness are primarily at the firm and business models levels (Appleyard 
and Chesbrough, 2017; Ciravegna and Maielli, 2011; Katila and Mang, 2003; Alexy et al, 
2009; Manzini, Lazzarotti and Pellegrini, 2016), and therefore there is little understanding of 
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how the choice between closed and open innovation is managed at the project level. 
Building on the PFI framework, we provide several contributions to the innovation 
management literature. First, our theoretical framework contributes to a process and 
temporal perspective of open innovation by providing empirical evidence that the choice 
between openness and closedness is not static but a dynamic strategy. Second, we extend the 
PFI model by considering appropriability regimes not as fixed but as variable over time. 
Third, we contribute to the open innovation literature by identifying two core project 
processes and their enabling mechanisms, which influenced the ability of Jaguar to 
maximize profits from the innovation of the project. These two core processes are: a) the 
timing of openness to external partners and b) an external loose project strategy after the 
shift to open innovation. Interestingly, by taking a temporal perspective our secondary 
contribution relates to the extension of the PFI model: we carve out an important distinction 
between factors and processes. We were in a position to go beyond the factors as 
represented in the PFI model at a specific point of time, and instead observe project 
processes and their enabling mechanisms which unfold during the different stages of the 
project. 
5.1 Timing of shifting from a closed to an open model of innovation 
The first core project process that influenced the ability of Jaguar to maximize profits from 
the innovation was the timing of openness to external partners. Previous research has 
emphasized the benefits of early supplier integration in the NPD process in terms of a 
reduction of modification costs and improved time to market (Milison and Wilemon, 1992; 
Swink, Talluri and Pandejpong, 2006; Wynstra and Pierick, 2000). However, the benefits of 
supplier integration into NPD are not universal, as supported in our case study (Eisenhardt 
and Tabrizi, 1995; Najafi et al., 2013; Trygg, 1993). Our findings show that Jaguar avoided 
the trap of early openness by judiciously closing the innovation model to any external partners 
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in the early stages of the project. The drivers of a closed innovation model were a weak patent 
position and the time required to increase the technological maturity of the innovation, prior 
to the application of a patent. The closed model of innovation was enabled by Jaguar’s world 
class R&D capabilities. In line with the PFI model, the absence of any IP protection makes 
imitation easy in stages one and two of the project; hence markets do not work well and the 
profits from the innovation may accrue to others rather than the innovator. However, in the 
PFI framework, appropriability regimes are fixed in time, although this misses the critical 
element that firms can also endogenously shape it by their behaviors and strategies, either by 
strengthening or weakening it over time (Pisano, 2006). By shifting from a static to a dynamic 
representation of the PFI framework at the project level, we extend the PFI model by 
providing a fine-grained view of how NPD managers proactively change the IP position from 
a weak to a strong one and deploy several informal defense mechanisms at different stages of 
the project to minimize the risks of misappropriation  
As the project was progressing, higher innovation speed combined with the need for 
complementary capabilities motivated the shift from a closed to an open model of 
innovation. Our findings also suggest that it is not just a question of either closing or 
opening the model of innovation, but there was an intermediate process in readying the 
transition from closed to open innovation enabled by two mechanisms. First, the pro-active 
change in the IP position from a weak to a strong position, as marked by submission of a 
patent prior to shifting to an open model of innovation, was the first early defensive 
mechanism that conferred on Jaguar an effective protection against opportunistic behavior, 
which strengthened its potential to profit from the innovation before engaging with any 
external partners. Our findings support the view that IP enables open innovation as it is a 
safeguard for knowledge protection (Bahemia et al., 2017; Laursen and Salter, 2014; Zobel 
et al., 2016), rather than the view that patents may hinder open innovation relationships 
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(Katila and Mang, 2003; Katila, Rosenberger and Eisenhardt, 2008; West and Gallagher, 
2006).  
Second, an internal loose coupling project strategy that involved discretion, and 
modularity (Orton and Weick, 1990) was deployed as another mechanism to facilitate the 
intermediate process of readying the transition from closed to open innovation. For example, 
the project champion had the discretion and the autonomy to accelerate the innovation project. 
From this perspective, the project became more loosely coupled as the project champion was 
able to free it temporarily from the constraints of the firm (i.e. project termination) by 
uncoupling it from the internal R&D of Jaguar and opening the innovation model to external 
partners as a way of accelerating the innovation speed, and increasing variety (inputs from 
external partners). Furthermore, in keeping with the theory of loose coupling, modularity was 
present as unnecessary strong relationships with internal engineers were eliminated. In our 
case study, coupling provided access to internal resources, whereas modularity produced 
looseness and flexibility because internal R&D engineers were temporarily brought to the 
project only when needed.  
5.2 The implementation of an external loose project strategy after the shift to open 
innovation 
The second core project process that determined the ability of Jaguar to maximize the 
lion’s share of the profits was the implementation of an external loose project strategy that 
was enabled by two forms of modularity that we observe in our case study (Orton and Weick, 
1990). First, the innovation activities that were allocated to the external partners in the middle 
stages of the project were partitioned and modularized such that the external partners had 
knowledge of some modules and not of others. This form of modularity was an effective 
mechanism to hide information, protect IP and mitigate the risks of expropriation (Baldwin 
and Henkel, 2015; Ronde, 2001). Reduction of the scope of an alliance is an effective 
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alternative response to hazards in R&D cooperation, and control of the risks of leakage 
(Oxley and Sampson, 2004). Second, the project manager kept strategic suppliers at a distance 
by developing secretive and guarded behavior as an informal relational defense mechanism 
against the risk of the misappropriation of resources by external partners. Embedded ties 
between firms and external partners may also have a negative effect on knowledge sharing for 
innovation, as there are increased opportunities for using exchanged knowledge, to the 
detriment of partners (Anderson and Jap, 2005; Grayson and Ambler, 1999; Selnes and Sallis, 
2003). Taken together, the development of guarded and distant relationships as well as the 
reduction of the scope of the tasks assigned to external partners, can be considered as 
complementary informal defense mechanisms to the formal one that were deployed to nurture 
causal ambiguity in order to protect the radical innovation against imitation and the risks of 
misappropriation. According to the resource-based view of the firm, causal ambiguity “acts as 
a powerful block on both imitation and factor mobility” (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982, pp. 
420).  
Although the timing of the shift from a closed to an open innovation model and the 
implementation of an external loose coupling project strategy were key project processes that 
determined the ability of Jaguar to capture most of the value generated from the innovation, 
there were still risks of misappropriation of IP, as was demonstrated by Crios who 
independently patented technology from the foreground knowledge of the project (Granstrand, 
2001). This shows that despite the development of guarded relationships, there was a collateral 
risk of losing intellectual capital as external partners engaged in the project can find ways to 
circumvent  patents (Arundel, 2001; Cohen, Goto, Nagata, Nelson, and Walsh, 2002; 
Granstrand and Holgersson, 2014; Levin, et al., 1987). Although Crios filed a patent, the 
benefits that Jaguar has gained from their open innovation strategy in terms of speed of 
innovation and access to complementary capabilities substantially outweighed the small share 
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of profits appropriated by Crios as it was ultimately reflected by the project champion, ‘there 
are risks to open innovation, these risks can be managed….the biggest risk is not to open the 
innovation process.’  
5.4 Limitations and future research 
 Whilst this research has provided a fine-grained view of the dynamics between closed 
and open innovation at the project level, the findings of the case study remain limited to a 
single case study of a luxury car manufacturer, and its external validity therefore remains 
limited. We need additional case studies from the automotive industry, as well as from 
industries that are less conservative in their innovation strategy than car manufacturers 
(Dodourava and Bevis, 2014). Our findings are also restricted to a radical innovation, and it is 
uncertain if the conclusions can be extended to other types of innovation, such as incremental 
and process innovations.  There are several suggestions for future research. First, by moving 
from cross-sectional studies to longitudinal or panel studies that incorporate a temporal 
perspective, researchers can develop better theoretical frameworks of open innovation, as 
opening or closing of a project proves to be an essential dimension in the conceptualization of 
open innovation. We encourage researchers to do quantitative research about the dynamics of 
openness across different stages of NPD projects as our case study has clearly demonstrated 
there is a high degree of variation in terms of the type of innovation models (open versus 
closed), and in terms of the appropriation strategies (formal and informal) during the lifecycle 
of the project. Second, the current study describes a relatively successful project with respect 
to the timing of the transition between closed and open innovation. It would be interesting to 
examine failure cases and analyze how the poor timing of the transition between closed and 
open innovation during a project leads – among other factors – to a poor outcome. Finally, our 
case study has focused on factors that influence the movement from closed to open 
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innovation, but the dynamics can also go in the other direction. Multiple case studies will 
allow an in-depth understanding of the wide array of other possible causal conditions that 
would potentially influence a different sequencing between closed and open models of 
innovation than the one charted in our case study.  
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Appendices. 
 
Figure 1A: Aggregate dimension: Closed model of innovation during the project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First Order Categories Second Order Themes
Stages 1, 2 and beginning 
of stage 3
Drivers  of a closed 
model of innovation
 We created and sketched it in our studio to create something that is 
very Jaguar
Need to generate a unique 
and novel automotive 
industry concept
 The rotary shifter was a pure Jaguar innovation
 Design was managed internally, we very much have control over 
design of the rotary shifter
I didn't want to open it earlier because we hadn't got adequate 
protection for the idea nor had I got adequate maturity in the concept'. 
(Project Champion)
Need time to mature the 
concept internally
 We worked heavily in the research department  with the patent 
department in stages 1 and 2 of the project (Jaguar) before applying for 
the patent
 There was no patent for the rotary shifter in stage 1 and 2 of the 
project, the idea was quite fuzzy
Weak patent regime 
We find a problem, work it through and solve it'. (Design Manager)
The rotary shifter came from the research department very early on 
during the project' (Research Director)
Enabler of a closed 
model of innovation
 The initial work was done remotely from any suppliers and 
collaborators in stage 1 and 2
 We did it all internally in stage 1 and 2 of the project
We did it on our own and then we worked very closely with suppliers 
to get what we wanted in the later stages (stages 3,4,5)' (Engineer, 
Jaguar)
Internal research and 
development during the 
project: high research 
capability
 The idea of the rotary shifter was born internally in the company and 
the concept was created internally
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 Figure 1B: Aggregate dimension: Open model of innovation during the project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First Order Categories Second Order Themes
  Middle and late stages 
of the project (3,4,5)
At this point, I knew that the business itself was divided on the 
concept… there were an awful lot of concerns… so some of the 
concerns were: 'customers won’t like this  when they're driving' 
(Project Champion)
Surface Trigger to 
switch from a closed to 
open innovation                         
Critical Event: High level 
of concerns by Senior 
Engineering Team
‘It would have taken me longer to get all the people in the workshops
together, all the people that knew about shift-by-wire together, all the
people in the rapid prototyping team to generate the prototype parts.
Whereas an engineering services company has got everything there
and I can tell them, “This is what I want and I want it by this time. It 
was definitely in my interest to get the concerns addressed as fast as
possible’ (Project Champion)
Need  for a faster response 
time to the risks of project 
termination and need for 
innovation speed             
So, when I submit into Anaqua from that point on I can legally declare 
the idea as being patent pending, which we do.  So, we say we have an 
idea under NDA, under the non-disclosure agreement, we say we have 
an idea and we say it is patent pending. (Engineer, Jaguar)
Enablers to open 
innovation           
Readiness to submit a 
patent before opening up 
to external partners
The rotary shifter was heavily patented by us  and we work closely  in 
stage 3 with the patent department before we start any collaboration' 
(Engineer, Jaguar)
‘I made the decision to go to the University of Eos and to Venus for a
quotation for the scope of work. Based on their quotation, I raised a
purchase order. And at that point, that’s the only point at which I need
approval from the Head of Research…..And at that point he approves
it and the purchase order goes’ (Project Champion)
Internal loose coupling 
strategy                          
High level of autonomy of 
the project champion
It wasn’t a team. They were people that I could call upon for help for
different aspects of the work. So, for example I had help from design
in terms of they would input what it would look like... I had support
from the Human Factors team, they helped me with the experiments.
(Project Champion)
  Structure of the Team: 
weak membership of 
internal engineers to the 
project
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Figure 1B (continued): Aggregate dimension: Open model of innovation during the 
project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First Order Categories Second Order Themes
External Loose Coupling  
Project Strategy
Refer to Table 1 for the narrow scope of the innovation tasks to each
external partners
Modularity                                       
Reducing the scope of innovation 
tasks assigned to external partners
'The contract was not open ended…. an open ended with a drawback
budget would have been more appropriate' (Engineering Service
Company, Venus)
Although the relationship with Venus was good, trust was not high
there is always an element of risk that they will seek patents too'
(Engineer, Jaguar)
Non-disclosure agreements and contracts were used with external
partners: 'we would secure a non-disclosure agreement with whoever
we were speaking to, but the second thing is we prefer to have applied
for a patent so that the prior art is, if you like, recognised and stated
that we had lodged rights to IP prior to any discussion with any third
party. (Engineer, Jaguar)
Modularity                                       
Reducing the tightness of the 
relationships with external 
partners                              
Moderate level of secrecy  
Guarded relationships with 
external partners
Sometimes it (sharing of information) was not always reciprocated:
you put a question, it floats as no-one answers it' (Supplier, Crios)
Informal 
Defense 
Mechanisms
